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“There’s no question about it. Wall Street got drunk.”
—President George W. Bush

1

There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most
recent turmoil in the domestic and global financial markets was the
2
failure to properly regulate mortgage lending and consumer debt.
1. Andy Sullivan & Tabassum Zakaria, “Wall Street Got Drunk,” Bush
at private event, R EUTERS , July 23, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKN2330503720080723.
2. Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation,
WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15 (“This current financial crisis had many causes.
It had its roots in the global imbalance in saving and consumption, in the
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Regardless of whether the United States is now at the beginning,
middle, or end of what some call the “Great Recession,” it is clear
that there will be regulatory reform in response to this failure.
Indeed, some reforms have already occurred. Other reforms are
being debated. These initial reforms, however, have been largely
3
structural. The government still needs specific regulation of the
day-to-day conduct of mortgage brokers and lenders.
Part I of this article provides a brief history of the rise of the
subprime and Alt-A mortgage industry, the economic and
regulatory environment in which that rise occurred, and the
disastrous consequences of failed government policies. Part II
analyzes the failure to properly oversee mortgage lending and the
selling of mortgage backed securities through the lens of two
economic concepts: asymmetrical information and game theory.
Part III outlines Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law, one of
the toughest and most comprehensive mortgage lending statutes in
the country, and discusses the first case brought under this law.
Part IV concludes by analyzing how the Minnesota Anti-Predatory
Lending Law could serve as a model for national regulatory reform.
I.

THE RISE OF SUBPRIME AND ALT-A MORTGAGES

Creating a response to the foreclosure and economic crisis
4
requires a clear understanding of how the crisis occurred. There
5
are some who blame the Community Reinvestment Act. The
widespread use of poorly understood financial instruments, in shortsightedness
and excessive leverage at financial institutions. But it was also the product of basic
failures in financial supervision and regulation. Our framework for financial
regulation is riddled with gaps, weaknesses and jurisdictional overlaps, and suffers
from an outdated conception of financial risk.”).
3. See U.S. D EP ’ T OF T REASURY, F INANCIAL R EGULATORY R EFORM: A N EW
F OUNDATION, June 17, 2009, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf (proposing new financial regulatory structure and consumer
protection agency).
4. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (1905) (“Progress, far from
consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there
remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement:
and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual.
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the first
stage of life the mind is frivolous and easily distracted, it misses progress by failing
in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and
barbarians, in which instinct has learned nothing from experience.”).
5. Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry’s
Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2008)
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Community Reinvestment Act, aimed at preventing red-lining and
reverse red-lining, prohibited federally insured banks and thrifts
from limiting loans or prohibiting loans offered in certain
6
neighborhoods. Critics of the Community Reinvestment Act argue
that the government itself was to blame for the current economic
crisis by forcing innocent lenders to originate loans to high-risk
7
black and Hispanic borrowers. For example, Ann Coulter wrote
an article titled, “They Gave your Mortgage to a Less Qualified
8
Minority.” In her article, Ms. Coulter argues that the foreclosure
and economic crisis was caused by “political correctness being
9
forced on the mortgage lending industry in the Clinton era.” She
then posits that banks were forced to ignore credit scores and lend
based on “nontraditional measures of credit-worthiness, such as
having a good jump shot or having a missing child named
10
Caylee.”
This theory, related to the Community Reinvestment Act, has
11
The most high-risk
largely, if not entirely, been de-bunked.
lending occurred through non-bank lenders that were not even
12
covered by the Community Reinvestment Act. Some estimates are
that three-quarters of the sub-prime loans that were originated by
non-bank lenders during the real estate boom were not subject to
13
the Community Reinvestment Act. This is, of course, assuming
that the Act requires lenders to give loans to people who have good
jump shots, which it does not.
Sub-Part A of this section posits that the root cause of the crisis
was the regulatory structure itself, or lack thereof, and three critical
decisions made by the government from 1999 to 2004 to weaken
oversight of the financial services industry. Sub-Part B of this
section connects these three decisions to the sudden rise of subprime and Alt-A loan, from less than 5% of all mortgage

(summarizing and citing various commentaries blaming the Community
Reinvestment Act for the foreclosure crisis).
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Ann Coulter, They Gave Your Mortgage to a Less Qualified
Minority, HUMAN EVENTS ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://
www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=28714).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 12–14.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id. at 13–14.
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originations in 2000 to 40% of the mortgage market at the time of
the crash.
A. The Regulatory Environment
On January 23, 1996, President Clinton famously stated “The
14
Then, arguably influenced by
era of big government is over.”
approximately $1 billion in bi-partisan campaign contributions
from the financial services industry, Congress began systematically
15
dismantling the regulation of lenders and financial institutions.
First, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (GLB), removing restrictions that
prevented various financial services industries from merging,
growing larger, and becoming too big to fail. Second, Congress
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
removing the prohibition on unregulated derivatives or “side-bets”
that stocks or other financial instruments are going to rise or fall.
Third, Congress allowed the Securities and Exchange Commission
to double the amount of debt that investment companies, like Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, were allowed to accrue. Each of
these actions created a regulatory environment that was illequipped to manage billion-dollar companies that engage in risky
behavior.
1.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999
16

GLB
On November 12, 1999, Congress passed GLB.
eliminated the depression-era regulations set forth in the GlassSteagall Act, which limited the permissible activities of a bank. For
example, a bank could not sell insurance or have subsidiaries that
17
did nonbanking activities under the Glass-Steagall Act. With GLB,

14. President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23,
1996), available at http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/category/william-j-clinton
/page/5.
15. Center for Responsive Politics, Finance, Insurance, Real Estate: Long
Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php
?cycle=2010&ind=F (last visited August 18, 2009) (finding that the finance,
insurance and real estate industries contributed over $2.2 billion from 1990 to
2009, and approximately $1 billion from 1996 to 2004).
16. Pub. L. No. 106, 102 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1999)).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994). See also Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W.
Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J.
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such restrictions were eliminated. The only major requirement was
that the activities were done under the umbrella of a “Financial
Holding Company” and “complimentary” to the bank’s other
18
activities.
At its core, there were two fundamental flaws with GLB. While
sanctioning large, integrated financial, insurance, and investment
businesses, the drafters failed to reform or modernize the oversight
of these businesses. GLB retained separate and distinct regulatory
19
None of these
agencies across various industry segments.
regulators had the resources, authority, or jurisdiction to handle a
major economic crisis, as found in a report issued by the U.S.
Government Accounting Office in 2004 (four years prior to the
20
That report, in part,
height of the current economic crisis).
noted that the fractured regulatory system undermined the ability
21
of the government to identify problems in their early stages.
Not only did this fractured system allow predatory financial
products to “fall through the cracks,” as stated by former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, it also created a dangerous environment
wherein federal regulators competed with one another to be the
22
Federal regulators
regulator-of-choice for financial companies.
also deemphasized their role as consumer protection agencies and
23
were arguably captured by the industries they regulated.
CORP. L. 723, 755–765 (2000) (outlining the pre and post-GLB regulations,
particularly as they relate to insurance).
18. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(c)(1)(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (1999)
(creating a Financial Holding Company); Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1999)
(outlining permissible nonbanking activities).
19. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 96 (2009).
20. Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005)
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110
(2004)).
21. Id.
22. Moran, supra note 19, at 96; Diana McMonagle, Comment, In Pursuit of
Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the OCC’s Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533, 1541–42 (2004) (summarizing the argument that federal
regulators are in a “race to the bottom” often fueled by their need to obtain
examination fees to fund their agencies).
23. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can
Chew? 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515 (2007) (examining the agency-cost theory as it applies
to all of the persons who conduct and oversee a lending transaction, and arguing
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In addition to the restrictions that GLB eliminated, the
drafters and supporters of GLB deliberately chose not to create
regulations for hedge funds or derivatives. Hedge funds are private
pools of capital that are not open to the public, which means that
there are few public statements about a fund’s activities and
minimal transparency even to the investors who have provided the
24
fund managers with millions of dollars. Estimates of the size of
the hedge fund industry ranged from $1.2 to $2.4 trillion at its
25
peak.
Derivatives are essentially side-bets on whether a stock, bond,
or the overall market will increase or decrease in value that do not
26
require the bettor to ever purchase or sell the security itself. For
example, a derivative may be a bet related to whether the Standard
27
It is used by responsible
& Poor’s 500 Index will rise or fall.
28
investors to hedge against losses, but can easily be abused.
The earliest derivatives were sold in businesses called “bucket
29
Many blame
shops” and were just another form of gambling.
that federal regulators often do not place consumer protection as their primary
goal); H.D. Vinod, Conflict of Interest Economics and Investment Analyst Biases, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 53, 57 (2004) (“Unfortunately, what followed [the passage of GLB]
was predicted by economists’ ‘capture theory’ of regulation: sophisticated and
powerful financial institutions with considerable political clout simply captured or
co-opted the regulators.”).
24. Duff McDonald, Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 9, 2007,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30341 (stating
that hedge funds are high risk and high reward that rely on leverage: “[T]hat
means big bets with little or no downside protection. In a word, risky.”); Carrie
Johnson, Scrutiny Urged for Hedge Funds, WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at D02
(quoting Marc Kasowitz, a lawyer suing various hedge funds, who stated “no one”
knows within a trillion dollars how large the hedge fund industry is and Senator
Orrin Hatch who described hedge funds as the “Wild West of our financial
markets”).
25. Johnson, supra note 24, at D02.
26. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GAO/GGD-94-133, at 26 (1994); See also
Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the
Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 725–26 (2008)
(providing an overview and definition of various forms of present-day credit
derivatives instruments).
27. See Kim, supra note 26.
28. See id.
29. 60 Minutes: The Bet That Blew Up Wall Street (CBS television broadcast
report by Steve Kroft Oct. 26, 2008) (“In the early part of the 20th century, the
streets of New York and other large cities were lined with gaming establishments
called ‘bucket shops,’ where people could place wagers on whether the price of
stocks would go up or down without actually buying them. This unfettered
speculation contributed to the panic and stock market crash of 1907, and state
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these bucket shops as one of the causes of the stock market crash of
30
31
1929, and laws were passed to ban bucket shops. Despite these
32
early laws, derivatives rose to prominence again in the 1980s. The
risks, however, remained the same. Indeed, a May 1994 report to
Congress by the General Accounting Office was entitled Financial
33
Derivatives: Actions Needed To Protect the Financial System.
Both hedge funds and derivatives encourage unsustainable
34
borrowing and leveraging that resembles a Ponzi scheme.
35
Ultimately, it undermines the entire economy.
It is what
economist Hyman Minsky described over fifty years ago as his
“financial instability thesis”:
When the economy was strong and interest rates were low,
Minsky said, firms would borrow themselves (and the
economy as a whole) into periods of acute financial
fragility, hence the economy’s ‘tendency to explode.’
This tendency to explode resulted from structural biases
in capitalist economies towards increasingly riskier forms
36
of financing by firms.
Recognition of this risk was one of the primary reasons that
Senator Byron Dorgan chose not to support GLB. In fact, his
speech against GLB on the floor of the senate was incredibly
prescient. More than any other, the speech accurately predicted
the need for a massive government intervention just nine years
later:
Is it part of financial modernization to say this sort of
nonsense ought to stop; that banks ought not be able to
trade derivatives on their own proprietary accounts
because that is inherently gambling? . . . Does anybody
laws all over the country were enacted to ban them.”) available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/26/60minutes/main4546199.shtml.
See also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1655 (2008) (introducing
the creation of “bucket shop” laws).
30. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29.
31. See Kettering, supra note 29 (describing the creation of “bucket shop” laws
in “the late 1800s and early 1900s”).
32. Id. at 1654 (stating that “[t]he market in over-the-counter derivatives grew
from essentially nothing to enormous size in the course of the 1980s”).
33. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 26, at 1.
34. See Josè Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New
Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 473 (2009) (describing how Ponzi financing
arrangements operate).
35. See id.
36. Id. at 491.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/11

8

Ireland: After the Storm: Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Ex
1. Ireland.doc

11/17/2009 7:02 PM

2009]

REGULATION OF MORTGAGE BROKERS

9

think it makes any sense to have hedge funds out there
with trillions of dollars of derivatives, losing billions of
dollars and then being bailed out by a Federal Reserve–
led bailout because their failure would be so catastrophic
to the rest of the market that we cannot allow them to fail?
And as banks get bigger, of course, we also have
another doctrine. The doctrine in banking at the Federal
Reserve Board is called “too big to fail.” Remember that
term, “too big to fail.” It means at a certain level, banks
get too big to fail. They cannot be allowed to fail because
the consequence on the economy is catastrophic and
therefore these banks are too big to fail. Virtually every
single merger you read about in the newspapers these
days means we simply have more banks that are too big to
fail. That is no-fault capitalism: too big to fail. Does
anybody care about that? Does the Fed? Apparently
not. . . .
We have all these folks here who know a lot more
about this than I do, I must admit, who say: [e]xcept we
are creating firewalls. We have subsidiaries, we have
affiliates, we have firewalls. They have everything except
common sense; everything, apparently, except a primer
on history. I just wish, before people would vote for this
bill, they would be forced to read just a bit of the financial
history of this country to understand how consequential
37
this decision is going to be.
Despite Senator Dorgan’s speech, GLB overwhelmingly passed
in the Senate and House of Representatives. In the Senate, only
nine Senators voted against GLB. It passed in the House of
Representatives on a 362 to 57 vote, and then was signed by
President Clinton a few days later.
2.

The Commodity Futures Modernization Act

Approximately a year after the passage of GLB, the absence of
regulation related to derivatives, specifically credit default swaps,
became the express policy of the United States. In the late 1990s,
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission attempted to fill
the regulatory vacuum and oversee credit default swaps, but these

37. 145 CONG. REC. S4823 (daily ed. May 6, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Dorgan).
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38

efforts were challenged legally and publicly. One of the highest
profile critics of efforts to regulate derivatives was Federal Reserve
39
Chairman Greenspan spoke out
Chairman Alan Greenspan.
against regulation, even recanting his earlier support for regulating
40
professional investors of derivatives.
Then, in the waning days of the Clinton administration,
Senator Phil Gramm inserted a 262-page amendment called the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 into a much larger
41
omnibus spending bill. Without debate or even a hearing in the
House of Representatives, the modern unregulated derivatives
42
market was born. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 exempted most derivatives from federal oversight and
regulation as well as preempted any state laws that may have
43
prohibited the activity.
Although derivatives based on securities, like stocks, may be
regulated, derivatives on non-securities were exempted from the
44
Act. Therefore, credit default swaps based on pools of debt (like
mortgages) were free from regulation because pools of debt are
45
not technically securities.
3.

Blessing the Over-Leveraging of Wall Street Investment Banks

The capital that investment banks or broker-dealers must

38. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis,
Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider
Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 394–95 (2009).
39. Greenspan Urges Congress to Fuel Growth of Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2000, at C19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/11/business
/greenspan-urges-congress-to-fuel-growth-of-derivatives.html.
40. Id.
41. Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/
business/worldbusiness/17iht-17gramm.17881800.htm; Nelson D. Schwartz &
Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BU 1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/23how.html.
42. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29.
43. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1
(2000) (providing that swap agreements such as credit default swaps are not
securities); see also Kamman & Hood, supra note 38 (discussing the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006), which defines securities-based swaps and
provides the Securities and Exchange Commission only the authority to regulate
securities based swaps for fraud and nothing else, as well as no authority for nonsecurities-based swaps).
44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1.
45. Id.
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maintain is governed by the Net Capital Rule, which was
46
established in the mid-1970s. The Net Capital Rule, in essence,
requires investment banks to review their balance sheets and
47
categorize their tradable assets at market prices. A categorization
of assets includes equities or stocks, as well as Treasury bills or
48
bonds. Then, a discount or “haircut” is applied for each category,
meaning an investment bank must set aside a certain amount of
49
For
capital to protect itself from risk and market volatility.
50
example, equities had required a 15% haircut. The Net Capital
Rule also required that broker dealers limit their debt-to-net capital
51
ratio.
The catalyst for originally passing this rule was the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s concern about small, fly-by-night
52
firms destabilizing the market and causing a “race to the bottom.”
But, in 2004, support for the Net Capital Rule began to wane. The
SEC, concerned that the rule was too strict and would drive
53
investment banks overseas, created a special program for the
54
This new program was an
largest firms or broker-dealers.
alternative to the existing Net Capital Rule and its ratio
55
Specifically, a broker-dealer that had capital of
requirements.
over $5 billion could, under the new Consolidated Supervised
Entities program, use its own computer models as an alternative
56
The program was
method of calculating ratio requirements.
essentially a very high-profile, high-stakes experiment in selfregulation. This, in practice, allowed for much higher amounts of
debt.
Five broker-dealers immediately volunteered for the program:
46. Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer
Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 605, 624 (2009); Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of
Broker-Dealers, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com
/business/ex-sec-official-blames-agency-for-blow-up/86130.
47. Darcy, supra note 46, at 624; Satow, supra note 46.
48. Satow, supra note 46.
49. Satow, supra note 46; see Darcy, supra note 46, at 625 n.191.
50. Satow, supra note 46.
51. Id.
52. Darcy, supra note 46, at 624.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 240 (2004); Satow, supra note
46.
56. Satow, supra note 46.
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Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
57
Debt-to-net capital ratios soon became
and Morgan Stanley.
58
imbalanced, some as high as 40-to-1. Now, only Goldman Sachs
59
and Morgan Stanley exist, but neither are broker-dealers.
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley reorganized and obtained a
60
federal charter to simply be bank-holding companies.
In March 2008, Bear Stearns collapsed following the fall of two
large hedge funds and the withdrawal of millions of dollars by
61
major investors. Soon, JPMorgan Chase & Co. swept in to buy
Bear Stearns with the encouragement and blessing of the
government, and Bear Stearns, as an independent entity,
62
disappeared after eighty-five years. Lehman Brothers collapsed in
mid-September 2008 and declared bankruptcy after failing to
locate a buyer and the government refusing to bail out the
63
And, on the brink of collapse, Bank of America
company.
64
purchased Merrill Lynch for $50 billion. It was a deal that was not
only facilitated by the government, but also one in which Bank of
America’s CEO claims the company was forced by the federal
65
government to cooperate.
B. The “Giant Pool of Money” and the Perfect Storm
Along with a lax, if not non-existent, regulatory environment,
there was also a perfect storm of other factors that radically
transformed the housing sector in the United States and,

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
See Jonathan Stempel, Goldman Sachs Wins NY State Banking Charter,
REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingFinancial/
idUSN2845074320081128.
60. Id.
61. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, F ORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.fortune/
index.htm.
62. Id.
63. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/
15lehman.html?_r=2.
64. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends Role on Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/06/26/business/
26fed.html; Louise Story & Julie Creswell, For Bank of America and Merrill, Love Was
Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/08/business/08split.html.
65. Andrews, supra note 64.
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ultimately, created the current financial crisis. At the center of the
storm, there was what a National Public Radio program described
66
as a “giant pool of money.” The giant pool of money is all the
money in the world that people are saving in case of a catastrophe,
67
This giant pool of
retirement, education, or just a rainy day.
68
It had doubled over the past few
money equaled $70 trillion.
years from $36 trillion in 2000 to $70 trillion, as traditionally
69
poorer countries became richer countries. This pool of money
70
Rather, people are
did not and does not just sit in a bank.
responsible for safely investing such money to provide a nice profit
71
for the bank as well as stability for the depositor.
While the amount of money needed to be safely invested grew,
the traditionally safe investment vehicles, like United States
Treasury bonds, were no longer providing a sufficient return for
72
The value of the
the managers of the giant pool of money.
Treasury bonds’ return was suppressed by the extremely low
73
Therefore, the investors
interest rates at the time, about 1%.
started looking for other financial products that were both low risk
74
and provided a better return on the investment.
The answer to this problem came in the form of Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), or
75
These are all roughly the
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS).
same things: debt that has been pooled, converted into income
76
streams, further divided, ranked, and transformed into bonds.

66. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money (radio broadcast May 9, 2008
Program
#355),
available
at
http://www.thislife.org/extras/radio/355_
transcript.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2045–65 (2007) (explaining
how securitization works and theoretically addressing the lemon problem, and
discussing an “unholy alliance” of marginal lenders and loan aggregators affiliated
with Wall Street); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185, 2200–13 (2007) (describing how securitization works and how Wall
Street simultaneously dupes homeowners and its own investors with bad predatory
loans).
76. Peterson, supra note 75, at 2203.
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Through these financial products, the managers of the giant pool
of money were told they could have the security of an investment in
a home mortgage loan without the hassle of dealing with actual
77
homeowners.
Due to the size of the giant pool of money and the early
78
success of these securities, the demand was strong. However, in
order for Wall Street to sell CDOs, ABS or MBS to the managers of
the giant pool of money, Wall Street needed a significant number
79
of mortgages—far more than were historically being originated.
In response to this demand, underwriting standards deteriorated
and the mortgage industry promoted new products that invited
fraud and seemed pre-destined for foreclosure, such as a NINJA
loan (No Income, No Job or Assets), a NINA (No Income, No
Assets), stated-income, stated assets (no verification of application
information, underwriting merely based on applicant’s statements),
interest only mortgages, and Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages
80
(ARMs) or Pick-A-Payment loans.
The Option ARM or Pick-A-Payment loan was particularly
81
lucrative and dangerous. Option ARMs are a type of mortgage
that typically provides the consumer three choices each month: (1)
a fully amortizing payment—meaning a part of the payment pays
both the interest and part of the principal balance, which causes
the principal balance to go down; (2) an interest only payment,
meaning that the principal amount of the loan stays the same and
the homeowner pays only the interest; and (3) a negatively
amortizing payment, meaning that the homeowner’s payment
neither reduces the principal balance nor does it eliminate the
accrued interest—the principal amount of the loan actually goes
82
up.
Option ARMs were originally created for a small niche market

77. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, supra note 66.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. LoanBiz.com, Alternative Documentation Loans: A Mortgage Solution for
the Self Employed, http://www.loanbiz.com/alternative-documentation-loans-amortgage-solution-for-the-self-employed.htm (last visited August 12, 2009).
81. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2006,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/b400000.htm;
Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 5
BERKLEY BUS. L. J. 1, 20–21 (2008) (describing the various types of adjustable rate
mortgages, including Option ARMs).
82. Carrillo, supra note 81.
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83

of wealthy home buyers in the early 1980s. The product provided
these wealthy home buyers with flexibility, as well as the ability to
keep money that would ordinarily be used on a house payment
84
But, as home
available for other more lucrative investments.
prices dramatically increased in certain markets from 2000 to 2007,
unregulated brokers and banks pushed these products as a way to
85
This further
qualify more people for more expensive homes.
inflated the housing bubble, and justified the origination of even
86
more Option ARMs.
Now, 80% of all option ARM borrowers make only the
minimum payment each month, which means that they are not
87
With the decrease in
even paying the interest on their loan.
property values, many of these homeowners have no equity and are
severely “underwater,” meaning they owe more on their mortgage
88
than the home is worth. During the boom, the banks and owners
of these mortgages were generally unconcerned, because the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) accounting
89
rules allow them to report “phantom profits.” Specifically, GAAP
allows banks and investment companies to count as revenue the
highest amount of an option ARM payment, the fully amortizing
amount, even when borrowers choose to make only the minimum
90
payment. In essence, banks and investment companies pretend
that homeowners are paying more than they are paying each
month toward the homeowners’ mortgages, which, in turn, inflates
91
their earnings per share.
These exotic mortgage products were a breeding ground for a
variety of illegal behavior. A 2006 study on behalf of the Mortgage
Bankers Association found that 90% of all applications for stated
income loans contained inflated income, and over 60% were
92
inflated by more than 50%. The authors of the report warned:
83. Der Hovanesian, supra note 81.
84. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, supra note 66.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Der Hovanesian, supra note 81.
88. James Carlson, To Assign, Or Not To Assign: Rethinking Assignee Liability As A
Solution To The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1021, 1033
(2008).
89. Der Hovanesian, supra note 81.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Merle Sharick, Erin E. Omba, Nick Larson, & D. James Croft, Eighth
Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report to Mortgage Bankers Association, (Mortgage Asset
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“[s]tated income and reduced documentation loans speed up the
93
approval process, but they are open invitations to fraudsters.”
Government regulators did not intervene and issue regulations
related to stated income and low-documentation loans, so lenders
continued to compete furiously with one another to acquire these
94
In an article entitled “Sex, Lies, and
loans from brokers.
Subprime Mortgages,” the untoward conduct included untrained,
uneducated, female mortgage wholesalers who received milliondollar salaries to acquire mortgage loans from brokers and get
95
The article
underwriters to approve loans via sexual favors.
further describes bribes and spiffs, fabricated documents, doctored
pay stubs and bank account statements, embellished applicant job
titles, and harassment of underwriters who refused to approve
96
dubious loans.
C. Sub-Prime and Exotic Mortgages Go Mainstream and Then Go
Boom
“From 2000 to 2006, there was a dramatic increase in the
97
number of sub-prime or Alt-A mortgages” described above.
In 2000, the percentage of subprime mortgages
comprised about 2% of the overall mortgage market. In
2003, the percentage of subprime mortgages increased to
about 8%. In 2006, the percentage more than doubled to
22%. In the meantime, the Alt-A market of exotic
mortgages was created and soon occupied 18% of the
total mortgage marketplace. This growth in sub-prime
and Alt-A mortgages means that the overall percentage of
risky, toxic mortgages went from less than 5% to 40% of
98
the overall housing market in less than seven years.
Research Inst., Inc., Reston, Va.), April 2006, at 12, http://www.
marisolutions.com/pdfs/mba/MBA8thCaseRpt.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Mara Der Hovanesian, Sex, Lies, and Mortgage Deals, BUS. WK., Nov. 24,
2008, at 70, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_47/
b4109070638235.htm (using the headline “Sex, Lies, and Subprime Mortgages”).
96. Id.
97. Mark Ireland & Ann Norton, Legal Tools to Revitalize Neighborhoods That
Have Been Most Affected by the Foreclosure Crisis, THE COORDINATED PLAN TO ADDRESS
FORECLOSURES (Minnesota Foreclosure Partners Council, Twin Cities and Greater
Minnesota, Minn.), March 2009, at 3 (citing statistics from the Mortgage Bankers
Association).
98. Id.
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What made these mortgages so toxic were the terms. Eightynine to ninety-three percent of the subprime mortgages generated
during this period came with an exploding adjustable interest rate
after the initial teaser interest rate expired, and subprime
99
adjustable rate mortgages were set to adjust from 7% to 12%. As
the amount of equity decreased and underwriting standards
tightened, individual homeowners were no longer able to refinance
their toxic mortgages and were forced to sell or go into
100
foreclosure.
Although there are no authoritative, historic compilations of
101
foreclosure data, there is little doubt that foreclosure rates are at
102
It has been estimated that the nationwide
high levels.
foreclosure rate has more than doubled in the past eight years and
103
is at the highest level in more than twenty-five years. The Center
for Responsible Lending estimates that 15% of all subprime
104
These foreclosures, in the
mortgages will result in foreclosure.
aggregate, will cause neighboring properties to lose billions of
dollars in value and will thereby increase the number of blighted
105
communities nationwide.
99. Ctr. for Responsible Lending, A Snapshot of the Subprime Market (Nov.
28, 2007) (available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
tools-resources/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf).
100. Ireland & Norton, supra note 97; Danielle DiMartino and John V. Duca,
The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, ECONOMIC LETTER Vol. 2, No. 11 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.), Nov. 2007 (“Some 80 percent of outstanding
U.S. mortgages are prime, while 14 percent are subprime and 6 percent fall into
the near-prime category. These numbers, however, mask the explosive growth of
nonprime mortgages. Subprime and near-prime loans shot up from 9 percent of
newly originated securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006.”), available
at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.html#1.
101. Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public
Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (2008) (citing The Ctr. For
Statistical Research Inc., U.S. Mortgage Borrowing: Providing Americans with
Opportunity, or Imposing Excessive Risk? 11–12 (2007)) (noting the lack of
comprehensive data on foreclosures).
102. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., National Data: Housing
Finance, U.S. HOUS. MKT CONDITIONS, 3rd Quarter 1997, available at
http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/ushmc/fall97/nd_hf.html).
103. Id. at 691.
104. Id. See also ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO
HOMEOWNERS (Dec. 2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
research-analysis/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf.
105. Cox, supra note 101, at 691. See also Ctr. for Responsible Lending,
Subprime Spillover, Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202 Billion; 40.6 Million Homes
Lose $5,000 on Average (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITIES IN THE MODERN
MORTGAGE LOAN MARKET USING THEORIES OF ASYMMETRICAL
INFORMATION AND ECONOMIC GAME THEORY AS A GUIDE
The intellectual underpinnings for the decisions outlined in
Part I were set forth in the “competitive equilibrium paradigm”
106
107
articulated by Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes, and Ayn
108
Rand: free markets inherently lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes,
109
Supporters of
particularly if the government gets out of the way.
deregulation believed that there was no need for government
regulation and oversight, because the market could effectively
110
police itself. Why would a company ever do something that is not
in its self-interest?
Supporters of deregulation also believed that issues created by
asymmetrical information in mortgage lending—meaning that
borrowers know more about their ability to repay the principal
111
than lenders —could be overcome by the lenders themselves and
112
Lenders can use
that the government was no longer needed.
mathematical models to discern key indicators of credit
113
With computers and other sophisticated systems to
worthiness.
/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/subprime-spillover.pdf (describing how
foreclosures tend to depress neighboring property values, which results in a
reduced tax base for the community).
106. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (University of Chicago Press 1977) (1776).
107. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936).
108. AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL (Penguin Group 1986)
(1966).
109. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia Univ., Information and the
Change in the Paradigm In Economics, Nobel Prize Lecture at 472 & 503–504
(Dec. 8, 2001), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf (arguing that the market’s failure to effectively
police problems, such as pollution, illustrates how “informational imperfections”
in an economy may necessitate a government intervention).
110. Id. (“[T]he most important single idea in economics is that competitive
economies lead, as if by an invisible hand, to a (Pareto) efficient allocation of
resources . . .”).
111. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis. (Oct. 10, 2001), available
at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/press.html.
112. See id. at 505 (noting that asymmetries of information result in imperfect
competition and thereby impede market efficiency).
113. Id. at 477 (“Some, like George Stigler, while recognizing the importance
of information, argued that once the real costs of information were taken into
account, even with imperfect information, the standard results of economics
would still hold. Information was just a transactions cost.”).
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compensate for limited information, policymakers believed that the
market had finally reached its Pareto-equilibrium, a pure reflection
114
of the true costs of goods.
For example, at the height of the mortgage boom, Chairman
Alan Greenspan touted the deregulation and consolidation
115
resulting from the passage of GLB as a boon to consumers.
He
stated that “technological advancements” and complex algorithms
could now accurately predict risk:
With these advances in technology, lenders have taken
advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques
for efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of
consumers. . . . Where once more-marginal applicants
would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual
116
applicants and to price that risk appropriately.
In addition to technology, lenders were also relying heavily on
three tools that many economists believed could mitigate the risks
of asymmetrical information: signaling, screening and separating,
and guarantees. But all of these tools failed.
Sub-Part A of this Section provides a brief definition of the
tools used by the mortgage lending industry, and then Sub-Part B
of this article uses economic game theory to explain why the tools
of signaling, screening, and guarantees did not work. Sub-Part A
and Sub-Part B are included in this article because it is important
to consider how these tools could have been effective when
complemented by effective government regulation. In essence,
effective and targeted government regulation can ensure that bad
actions have consequences that the free market cannot provide.
A. Asymmetrical Information in Mortgage Lending and the Common
Tools Used to Mitigate Risk
One of the most important modern developments in
economic theory is the recognition that information plays a critical
role in a functioning economy, and that asymmetrical information
can have a negative impact on proper pricing and efficiency of the
114. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference 5
(Apr. 8, 2005) (transcript available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/
ag05/download/29243/Greenspan_20050408.pdf).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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117

market.
In fact, economists Joseph Stiglitz, A. Michael Spence,
and George A. Akerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for
118
their analysis of markets with asymmetrical information.
Stiglitz, Spence, and Akerlof were pioneers in asking questions
about why consumers and sellers often act irrationally or not in
their best interests; ultimately having adverse affects on the
119
Their conclusion was that in such situations there is an
market.
120
asymmetry of information.
A mortgage transaction is one example of a market with
asymmetrical information. In these transactions, it has traditionally
been assumed that the lender is in the weaker bargaining position
because the homeowner obviously has more information about his
121
In response, the lending industry
or her own ability to pay.
developed tools to evaluate borrowers. Three of the most common
122
tools are signaling, screening and separating, and guarantees.
1.

Signaling Through Credit Scores

The theory behind signaling and signaling models is that there
is necessary information that one party does not have and cannot
readily obtain, which requires that party to look at other attributes
123
to “signal” the information that is actually sought.
For example, an employer wants to know about the
124
productivity of a job applicant. Yet, the best person with the most
accurate knowledge of a job applicant’s productivity is the actual
125
Therefore, the employer often uses education as a
applicant.
126
signal of the applicant’s potential productivity. If the applicant’s
127
education is low, it is assumed that the productivity is low. If the
applicant’s education is high, it is assumed, based upon the

117. The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., supra note 111.
118. Id.
119. The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., supra note 111.
120. Id.
121. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm In Economics,
92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 470 (2002) (“[T]he borrower knows more about the
riskiness of his project than the lender does . . .”).
122. Id.
123. A. Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 434 (2002).
124. Id. at 436–37.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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attributes necessary to obtain such an education, that the
128
applicant’s productivity is high.
In mortgage lending, the credit score was one signal that was
often relied upon above all other signals by lenders as well as by the
underwriters, Wall Street investment firms, and credit rating
129
agencies. This was illustrated by the prevalence and popularity of
130
Even after the loans
the stated-income and stated-asset loans.
acquired the nickname “liar’s loans” and it was well known that the
stated information was very likely to be false, such loans continued
131
to be originated based upon an applicant’s high credit score.
2.

Screening and Separating Through Actions

The theory of both screening and separating is that, faced with
a situation wherein a person has limited knowledge, that person
can construct barriers or options that force the other party to
132
screen and separate him or herself. In doing so, the more
knowledgeable person conveys the necessary information to the
133
other party. For example, an insurance company that only wants
healthy insureds could locate itself on the fifth floor of a building
with no elevator. The willingness of an applicant to walk up the
five flights of stairs, or a potential applicant’s decision not to walk
134
The less
up the five flights of stairs conveys information.
informed party is forcing the other party to select or reject him or
135
herself.
Similarly, for example, an insurance company can offer a
variety of insurance products, some with high co-payments and
high deductibles with low monthly premiums, and others with low
128. Id.
129. Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar’s Loan, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2008),
http://www.slate.com/id/2189576/ (“These were not ‘subprime’ loans. The
borrowers’ average credit score was 705, well within prime territory.”); E. Scott
Reckard, Defaults Exposing Truth of “Liar’s Loans”, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2004125368_liarloa
ns15.html (“Numbers from industry trackers suggest that these borrowers — most
of whom boast respectable, often top-tier credit scores and appear to have
substantial incomes and home equity—are starting to create a second tide of
defaults in addition to the subprime-loan meltdown.”).
130. Reckard, supra note 129.
131. Id.
132. Stiglitz, supra note 121, at 463, 472.
133. Id. at 472.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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co-payments and low-deductibles with high monthly premiums.
The various products theoretically force potential insureds to
137
The applicants disclose their own
separate themselves.
perceptions of their health, based upon the types of plans that they
138
A healthy individual would likely choose the high cochoose.
payment and high-deductible with low monthly premium, because
that individual believes they are healthy and wants the lower
139
monthly payment.
In mortgage lending, the originators of mortgage loans offer a
variety of products and interest rates. The belief is that individuals
that are the lowest credit risk and the most likely to repay the
mortgage loan will not choose a sub-prime or high interest rate
loan, because they know that they pay their bills and qualify for a
better loan product. Likewise, a sub-prime borrower knows that
they are likely to default and have limited credit options.
Therefore, they accept the higher interest rate. The credit market,
in theory, sorts itself.
In separating, the lender relies heavily upon a mortgage
broker to act in a manner that guides the homeowner to the
appropriate mortgage product. In practice, it has been found that
140
Many
such efficient and accurate separating did not occur.
141
subprime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans.
3.

Guarantees

In order for a more informed seller to assuage the fears of less
informed “buyers,” sellers began offering guarantees to the buyers
142
A good guarantee
related to the quality of the goods or services.
conveys needed and otherwise indiscernible information about the
143
The better the guarantee, the buyer is
product to the buyer.
intended to assume and believe that the product is better. In that

136. Id. at 479. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing, and
Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 407, 414 (1977).
137. Stiglitz, supra note 136 at 414–21.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 419.
140. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 44 (Feb.
2004), available at http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Community_Reinvestment/
Reports/S_and_E_2004/separate_and_unequal_2004.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Stiglitz, supra note 121, at 468.
143. Id.
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144

sense, a guarantee is a type of signal.
It is, however, more direct
than employment history, education, or credit scores in
determining the likelihood of paying back a loan.
In the mortgage lending industry, the use of guarantees was
common at virtually every stage. Borrowers signed a guarantee in
145
The standard,
connection with their mortgage loan application.
boilerplate 1003 mortgage loan application contains a lengthy
“Acknowledgement and Agreement” that states that the borrower
understands that the lender is relying on all of the information in
146
The borrower then acknowledges that false
the application.
statements may result in civil penalties as well as criminal
147
punishment, fines or imprisonment.
Mortgage brokers sign an agreement with the lenders or
originators of a mortgage loan, stating that they will not submit a
loan application that contains false or misleading information.
Most lenders further require that the brokers agree to “buy back”
mortgage loans, if it is discovered that there was fraud in the
application and origination of the loan.
Similarly, the lenders or originators of mortgage loans made
further guarantees related to the absence of fraud when that loan is
148
Lenders and originators also agreed to buy back
securitized.
loans that defaulted within a certain period of time; underwriters
often provided further guarantees to investors related to the overall
149
performance of the pool of mortgage loans. These were internal
and external enhancements that included buy-back provisions and
insurance in the event that fraud was discovered or performance
150
The credit rating agencies,
failed to meet certain expectations.
like Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s, relied heavily on these
151
Absent these
guarantees in rating the bond certificates.
guarantees, the bonds would not have been investment-grade and

144. Id.
145. Uniform Residential Loan Application Form 1003, available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/pdf/sellingtrans/1003.pdf.
All mortgage loans contain some sort of signing statement; the most prevalent is
the signing statement contained in the 1003 Form produced and distributed by
Fannie Mae.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Engel & McCoy, supra note 75, at 2070.
149. Id. at 2062.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2046.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 11
1. Ireland.doc

24

11/17/2009 7:02 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

would likely have not been sold.

[Vol. 36:1

152

B. The Housing Bubble and Foreclosure Crisis Viewed Through the
Lens of Economic Game Theory
As stated above, there was a working assumption that
computer models, complex algorithms, and mitigation tools
153
It was
effectively managed risk without government regulation.
an assumption premised on the idea that an efficient equilibrium
in a market not only exists, but that it can also be reached by the
154
Specifically, each individual actor
market actors themselves.
within an economic market is so small that his interactions do not
155
and cannot affect the entire market.
Game theory, including the behavioral and emotional
branches of economic game theory, recognizes that such perfect
156
The assumption of “small” actors—
competition is unrealistic.
whose fraud, strategies and misdeeds don’t have an effect—is not
157
universally true and arguably not even that common. Going back
to the seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
published in 1944, game theory recognizes that there can be very
large actors whose actions can interfere with the holy grail of
158
perfect competition and Pareto equilibrium.
The mortgage lending industry and post-GLB financial services
industry is just such an economic market where the actions of
relatively few actors have a profound effect upon the market as a
whole. For example, there are very few major credit rating
agencies for mortgage-backed securities. The decision by any one
of these credit rating agencies to downgrade the investment quality
of such mortgage-backed securities or deny a triple-A bond rating
152. Id.
153. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
155. See John C. Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information, Nobel Lecture
at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, (Dec. 9, 1994),
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1994/
harsanyi-lecture.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 136 (“[F]or most parts of the economic system, perfect competition
would now be an unrealistic assumption. Most industries are now dominated by a
small number of large firms, and labor is often organized in large labor unions.
Moreover, the central government and many other government agencies are
major players in many markets as buyers and sometimes also as sellers, as
regulators, and as taxing and subsidizing agents.”).
158. Id.
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to sub-prime or Alt-A (e.g., low doc, no doc, or option ARMs)
securities could have had a substantial impact in preventing the
current foreclosure and economic crisis. If the credit rating
agencies had scrutinized pools of mortgage loans more carefully,
lenders would have been forced to provide and adhere to stricter
underwriting standards, and the credit rating agencies would have
likely demanded further internal and external enhancements for
top-rated, triple-A bonds.
The larger vertically and horizontally integrated financial
services companies, as well as the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, further undermine the concept of a small, single actor whose
decisions have no impact on the overall market. Therefore, the
decision to deregulate, as outlined in Part I, and rely on the
traditional mitigation tools outlined in Part II, Sub-Part A, fail to
consider how the unfettered ability of this relatively small number
of actors to generate or approve trillions of dollars of mortgage
loans could destabilize not just the housing market but the global
economy. The housing bubble and the economic collapse can be
traced to just a handful of financial services companies that
generated, underwrote, or securitized billions of dollars of
mortgage loans and related securities.
The mortgage lending industry or housing market may be
fairly categorized as an I-Game, meaning that there is incomplete
information among the actors, as compared to a C-Game, meaning
that there is complete information among the actors. The failure
of signaling, screening and separating, and guarantees is most
easily traced to the fact that the market actors were participating in
an on-going or continuous I-Game. While such tools may be
effective in self-regulating a single transaction, the entire mortgage
lending industry (from the broker to the investor) was not
participating in a single transaction.
There were multiple
transactions over the course of many years with enormous pressure
for the companies to reap large returns or profits. This had an
impact on the actor’s strategies, incentives, and priorities. Each
actor was gathering information and analyzing short-term and longterm risks of violating contractual terms, bargaining in bad faith, or
even behaving illegally.
C. What Will the Punishment Be?
The broker is evaluating what punishment, if any, will truly
occur for fraudulently inflating an applicant’s income in a stated-
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income or low documentation loan. The lender is evaluating
whether the underwriter or bondholders will actually exercise their
buy-back rights. The credit reporting agencies are evaluating
whether they will lose business if they toughen their rating
requirements. In an isolated transaction, the market actors’
analyses would be different. Indeed, the misplaced market
incentives of this continuous I-Game was illustrated during a
Congressional hearing related to credit rating agencies and the
financial crisis, showing that competition for business among the
159
credit rating agencies skewed their business model.
For example, one confidential presentation to the Board of
Directors of Moody’s stated the following under the header
“CONFLICT OF INTEREST”:
Ideally, competition [among credit rating agencies] would
be primarily on the basis of ratings quality, with a second
component of price and a third component of service. . . .
The real problem is not that the market does
underweights [sic] ratings quality but rather that, in some
sectors, it actually penalizes quality by awarding rating
mandates based on the lowest credit enhancement
needed for the highest rating. Unchecked, competition
on this basis can place the entire financial system at risk.
It turns out that ratings quality has surprisingly few
friends: issuers want high ratings; investors don’t want
rating downgrades; short-sighted bankers labor shortsightedly to game the rating agencies for a few extra basis
160
points on execution.
This memorandum clearly describes how there were and are
161
Credit rating agencies had
cross and competing motives.
pressure to maintain market share, while trying to keep perspective
and ethics in the midst of an onslaught of investment bankers and
lenders pitching them deals and tempting them to “drink the Kool159. Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Oversight
Comm., 111th Cong. (2008).
160. Memorandum from Raymond McDaniel, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Moody’s Corp., on Credit Policy Issues at Moody’s Suggested by the
Subprime/Liquidity Crisis to the Board of Directors at Moody’s Corp. (Oct.
21, 2007), http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_
on_Oversight/Confidential_Presentation_to_Moodys_Board_of_Directors_October
_2007.pdf, (provided in a confidential presentation to Moody’s Board of
Directors, made public at Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing
Before the H. Oversight Comm., 111th Cong. (Oct. 22, 2008)).
161. Id.
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162

Aid.”
The market actors ultimately determined that there was little
risk to originating more mortgage loans, while there could be
serious consequences for originating fewer. That is why signaling,
screening and separating and guarantees failed. The traditional
reliance upon a borrower’s credit score as a “signal” failed because
the other information used to underwrite a loan (income, debt,
163
There was seemingly no penalty for
assets) was often false.
providing such false information, and an immediate financial
164
reward for originating the mortgage loan.
The reliance on a broker to help sort and separate
homeowners into the appropriate financial product failed because
brokers were financially rewarded by lenders to steer borrowers
165
The reliance on guarantees similarly failed
into high-cost loans.
because all of the actors perceived little risk of punishment for
breaching their guarantees and many of the brokers and lenders
166
Once pervasive fraud or illegal business
were under-capitalized.
practices were identified, the mortgage brokers and lenders simply
167
Thus, mortgage brokers
disappeared or declared bankruptcy.
168
Their
and lenders avoided any pecuniary punishment.
169
guarantees were of no value.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Der Hovanesian, supra note 95.
Id.
See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS: A POWERFUL
INCENTIVE FOR EQUITY THEFT, CRL ISSUE BRIEF NO. 11, JUNE 18, 2004, available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/ib011YSP_Equity_Theft-0604.pdf.
166. This phenomenon is aptly described, along with other issues surrounding
securitization by Professor Eggert, in a 2002 law review article that was incredibly
forward-thinking, published six years before the complete economic melt-down.
Although Professor Eggert describes the consequences to consumers, the
undercapitalization has an effect both up and down the vertical economic stream:
[B]ecause securitization allows individuals with little or no
capital of their own to originate or broker loans, it dramatically
reduces the likelihood that the borrower can obtain any sort of
repayment for her damages from the broker or originator, who
can easily avoid paying any sizeable damages judgment by
declaring bankruptcy or merely disappearing.
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 556 (2002).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. An apt illustration of the worthless guarantee is featured in the movie
Tommy Boy staring the now-deceased comedian Chris Farley. In the movie, the
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III. MINNESOTA’S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW
Although the ability for states to regulate lending is limited by
federal preemption, many states have passed or updated laws that
regulate the conduct of mortgage brokers and certain lending
170
For example, some states prohibit churning, meaning
practices.
that a homeowner is refinanced repeatedly with little to no benefit,
Chris Farley character (Tommy) is attempting to save his father’s auto-parts
factory by going on a major sales trip with the actor David Spade (Richard
Hayden). In closing his first major sale, Tommy must overcome the fact that his
primary competition guarantees their product:
Tommy: Let’s think about this for a sec, Ted, why would somebody put a
guarantee on a box? Hmmm, very interesting.
Ted Nelson, Customer: Go on, I’m listening.
Tommy: Here’s the way I see it, Ted. Guy puts a fancy guarantee on a box
‘cause he wants you to feel all warm and toasty inside.
Ted Nelson, Customer: Yeah, makes a man feel good.
Tommy: ‘Course it does. Why shouldn’t it? Ya figure you put that little box
under your pillow at night, the Guarantee Fairy might come by and leave
a quarter, am I right, Ted?
[chuckles until he sees that Ted is not laughing too]
Ted Nelson, Customer: [impatiently] What’s your point?
Tommy: The point is, how do you know the fairy isn’t a crazy glue sniffer?
“Building model airplanes” says the little fairy; well, we’re not buying it.
He sneaks into your house once, that’s all it takes. The next thing you
know, there’s money missing off the dresser, and your daughter’s
knocked up. I seen it a hundred times.
Ted Nelson, Customer: But why do they put a guarantee on the box?
Tommy: Because they know all they sold ya was a guaranteed piece of s***.
That’s all it is, isn’t it? Hey, if you want me to take a dump in a box and
mark it guaranteed, I will. I got spare time. But for now, for your
customer’s sake, for your daughter’s sake, ya might wanna think about
buying a quality product from me.
Ted Nelson, Customer: [pause] Okay, I’ll buy from you.
TOMMY BOY, (Paramount Pictures 1995), available at http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0114694/quotes (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
170. Preemption has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which invalidates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to
federal law. See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. Under our dual banking system,
commercial banks have the option of being federally or state chartered. Federally
chartered (national) banks are governed by the National Bank Act of 1874, which
sets forth chartering criteria, basic banking and investment powers, lending and
borrowing limitations, and corporate powers and duties. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–43.
Pursuant to the NBA, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged
with the regulation of national banks. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has taken an expansive view of its power
to pre-empt. See 69 Fed. Reg. 1904-01; 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2004); see also National
Conference of State Legislatures, Mortgage Lending Practices State Statutes,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12511 (last visited Aug. 18, 2009)
(summarizing other conduct specific prohibitions).
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171

as well as negative amortization loans.
Other states license
mortgage brokers and require that the mortgage brokers post a
172
surety bond.
But Minnesota has the most comprehensive Anti-Predatory
173
Lending Law in the country. Indeed, a New York Times editorial
174
called the law “farsighted” and “excellent.”
The tools provided
by and the scope of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law are
described in Sub-Part A. Sub-Part B describes the first case brought
under the statute.
A.Summary of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law
Individual provisions within Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory
Lending Law are important, but what makes the law a model is its
comprehensive approach to the problem. The amendments passed
in 2007 did not just add new standards of conduct, but also created
powerful enforcement tools and meaningful remedies as well as
making existing laws more effective. Finally, and most importantly,
the new law creates a duty of agency between the borrower and the
171. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-53-101 to -106 (2009 Supp.); CAL. FIN. CODE §§
4970, 4973 (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-101 (West Supp.
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-40-105 (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
494.0078–.00797 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2004
& Supp. 2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1–77/99 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/1–137/75 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
286.8-010 to -990 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.100
(LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 2-509, 8-103, 8-206-A, 10-102
(2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 429 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 506
(Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 12-127, -311, -409.1, -1029 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009); NM. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-21A-1 to -14 (2003 & Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-204 (West Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 2081–2093
(West Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-23-5, -25.2-1 to -15 (Supp. 2008); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 37-23-10 to -85 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-20-101 to -111
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-422 to -422.1 (Supp. 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
428.202–.211 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); see also Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, Mortgage Lending Practices, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=
12511 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law is not
included in this list because it will be discussed in detail in Section III, Sub-Part A.
172. The following is a sample of requirements by some state statutes: Arizona
($10,000 to $15,000 bond, three years experience and pass written exam);
Arkansas (net worth of $25,000 and surety bond of $35,000); Connecticut (surety
bond of $40,000); Kentucky (surety bond for $50,000 and training course);
Nebraska (surety bond for $50,000); Texas (net worth of $25,000 or surety bond of
$50,000).
173. MINN. STAT. § 58.13 (2008).
174. Editorial, Common Sense in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at WK9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/opinion/08sun3.html.
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mortgage broker. This duty creates a general and flexible tool to
combat the new schemes of tomorrow’s predatory lenders.
1.

Enforcement and Remedies

Until the passage of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law,
no express private right of action existed for consumers that
specifically targeted illicit lending practices. The new law did not
just give homeowners the private right to enforce new standards of
conduct in Minnesota, but it also provided an expansive private
right of action for “any violation of state or federal law regulating
175
The
residential mortgage loans,” and misconduct by appraisers.
remedies for violations are cumulative but include (1) actual,
incidental, and consequential damages; (2) statutory damages
equal to the amount of all lender fees included in the amount of
the principal of the residential mortgage loan as defined in section
58.137; (3) punitive damages if appropriate, and as provided in
sections 549.191 and 549.20; and (4) court costs and reasonable
176
attorneys’ fees.
The new law, however, only applies to non-bank lenders and
mortgage brokers, including brokers who help originate mortgages
177
It exempts state and
for state and federally chartered banks.
178
federally chartered banks from liability under the Act.
This
limitation is due to federal pre-emption, and does not and should
not be replicated in a federal statute that uses the Minnesota AntiPredatory Lending Law as a model.
The new Anti-Predatory Lending Law also created a new crime
of “Residential Mortgage Fraud.” The law makes it illegal
whenever a person:
175. MINN. STAT. § 58.18 (2008) (giving private right of action for any violation
of the standards of conduct in section 58.13, including subdivision 1(8)); MINN.
STAT. § 82B.24 (2008) (creating a private right of action related to appraiser
misconduct).
176. MINN. STAT. § 58.18, subdiv. 1, 3 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 82B.24, subdiv. 1, 3
(2008).
177. See id. §§ 58.04, subdiv. 4, 58.13, subdiv. 1 (b).
178. See id. §§ 58.04, subdiv. 4, 58.13, subdiv. 1 (b). It should be noted that
mortgage brokers who help originate a mortgage loan on behalf of a state or
federally chartered bank are covered by Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law
and can be liable for damages under the Act. The federal pre-emption of state
laws does not extend to mortgage brokers, and one of the main purposes for
enacting the law were the predatory lending practices that were facilitated by
mortgage brokers regardless of whether they were helping to originate a non-bank
lender’s mortgage loan or a state or federally chartered bank.
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(1) knowingly makes or causes to be made any deliberate
and material misstatement, misrepresentation, or
omission during the mortgage lending process with the
intention that it be relied on by a mortgage lender,
borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending
process;
(2) knowingly uses or facilitates the use of any deliberate
and material misstatement, misrepresentation, or
omission, knowing the same to contain a material
misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission, during the
mortgage lending process with the intention that it be
relied on by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other
party to the mortgage lending process; or
179
(3) conspires to violate clause (1) or (2).
2.

Mortgage Broker and Non-Bank Lender Standards of Conduct

There are twenty-seven separate standards of conduct for
“mortgage originators,” with five of those standards having been
enacted as part of the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending
180
Law.
The existing standards of conduct, however, are also
important. Because the legislature gave a private right of action for
violations of any of the twenty-seven standards, each should be
reviewed for applicability in any action. The following are some of
the most important standards of conduct set forth in the statute.
a.

Prohibiting a Mortgage Originator From Setting a
Homeowner up for Failure

There are four standards that prohibit a mortgage broker or
mortgage loan originator from not acting in the borrower or
homeowner’s best interest. These standards include making or

179.
180.

Id. § 609.822.
MINN. STAT. § 58.02 subdiv. 19 (2008)
‘Residential mortgage originator’ means a person who, directly
or indirectly, for compensation or gain or in expectation of
compensation or gain, solicits or offers to solicit, or accepts or
offers to accept an application for a residential mortgage loan
through any medium or mode of communication from a
borrower, or makes a residential mortgage loan. ‘Residential
mortgage originator’ includes a lender as defined in subdivision
11 and a broker as defined in subdivision 13.); MINN. STAT. §
58.13, subdiv.1 (b)(2008). Subdivision (a)(23) to (27) were
part of the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending law.
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assisting with the origination of a loan “with the intent that the
loan will not be repaid” and that title will transfer to the originator
181
through foreclosure; making or assisting with the origination of a
loan that is “of a lower investment grade” than the homeowner or
borrower would otherwise qualify for based on his or her credit
182
score; making or assisting with the origination of a loan without
183
verifying the borrower’s ability to pay the fully amortizing rate;
and engaging in “churning,” meaning that the new loan does not
184
provide a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower.
With regard to verifying an individual’s ability to pay, it is
important to note that the “ability” of the borrower cannot be
185
Previously, it was common for
based upon the initial teaser rate.
predatory lenders to underwrite to the initial teaser rate and not
186
Under
consider the ability to pay once the teaser rate expired.
this provision, the borrower must have sufficient income or other
assets to pay the loan when the rate adjusts to its true interest rate.
b.

Inflating Appraisals

Mortgage loan originators, including mortgage brokers, are
prohibited from compensating, directly or indirectly, coercing or
intimidating an appraiser for the purpose of influencing the
judgment of the appraiser related to the value of the borrower’s
187
home.
c.

Banning Toxic or Exploitative Mortgages

Mortgage loan originators are prohibited from making,
providing, or arranging for a loan that allows for negative
188
The law further
amortization during any six-month period.
prohibits the origination of a loan that refinances or pays-off a
“special mortgage,” unless the borrower has received counseling
189
For example,
from an authorized, independent loan counselor.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

MINN. STAT. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(13) (2008).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(18).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(24).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(25).
See id.
PRENTISS COX, CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE
REGULATION IN MINNESOTA 8–3(A)(1) (2d ed. 2009).
187. MINN. STAT. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(11) (2008).
188. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(27).
189. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(23).
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a homeowner who has a zero interest or total forgiveness loan
through a charity, like Habitat for Humanity, needs to receive
housing counseling prior to refinancing out of such a special
mortgage.
This provides extra protection to vulnerable
homeowners who may otherwise be convinced by an unscrupulous
mortgage broker to give up a zero interest loan to pay-off
unsecured credit card debt.
d.

Truthful Marketing: Apples to Apples

In addition to general prohibitions of false and misleading
190
advertising, the law was further amended to specifically prohibit a
common tactic used by mortgage brokers: comparing apples to
oranges. Often a homeowner will be told that refinancing will
result in significantly lower monthly payment. After closing, the
homeowner discovers that the quoted, new monthly payment does
not include taxes and insurance.
The amendment creates a new standard of conduct that
requires that a homeowner be informed about the total monthly
payment, including “the amount of the anticipated or actual
191
periodic payments for property taxes and hazard insurance.”
However, disclosure must also indicate if the refinanced loan does
192
not have an escrow account.
e.

Handling Client Funds

Three of the standards of conduct relate to the handling of
193
client funds.
Minnesota Statute section 58.13, subdivision 1(1)
prohibits a mortgage loan originator, which includes a broker,
from failing to “maintain a trust account to hold trust funds
194
received in connection with a residential mortgage loan,” and
subdivision 1(2) prohibits a mortgage loan originator from failing
to “deposit all trust funds into a trust account within three business
days of receipt; commingle trust funds with funds belonging to the
licensee or exempt person; or use trust account funds for any
195
purpose other than that for which they are received.”
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(9), (19).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(26).
Id.
See id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(1)–(2), (4).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(1).
Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(2).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 11
1. Ireland.doc

11/17/2009 7:02 PM

34

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

Subdivision 1(4) prohibits a mortgage loan originator from failing
to “disburse funds according to its contractual or statutory
196
obligations.”
f.

Catchall

In addition to the specific prohibitions, the code of conduct
197
also includes a catchall. The catchall provision makes a violation
of any state or federal law “regulating residential mortgage loans” a
198
basis for a cause of action.
3.

A 5% Limit on Financed Charges

In 2001, the Minnesota State Legislature amended chapter 58
to limit “lender fees” that are financed as part of the principal loan
199
200
amount.
The limit is five percent.
In 2007, the definition of
lender fee broadened to not just include the charges “payable by
201
the borrower.” Lender fee now includes all charges paid “by the
202
lender to a mortgage broker.”
Therefore, a “yield spread
premium” paid outside of closing by a lender to a mortgage broker
counts toward the 5% cap on financed charges.
This is an important change because yield spread premiums
have been an on-going concern to consumer advocates for many
years.
A YSP [Yield Spread Premium] is a cash bonus that a
broker receives from a lender for placing borrowers in a
loan with a higher interest rate than the lender would
accept. The higher the interest rate, the higher the
premium received by the broker. These kickbacks provide
brokers a strong incentive to charge borrowers a higher
interest rate when they could qualify for a less expensive
loan. The effect of YSPs is to steal equity from struggling
203
families.
196. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(4).
197. See id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(8).
198. Id.
199. COX, supra note 186, at 8–8(C).
200. MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008). It should also be noted that
federal statute does not preempt Minnesota’s limits on financed charges
proscribed in this statute. See COX, supra note 186. Minnesota opted-out of the
preemption. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 47.203–.204 (1999)).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008).
202. Id.
203. Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 165
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For example, a single mother who was assisted by the Center
for Responsible Lending paid a broker over $9,000 in settlement
204
The interest rate was
charges on just a $43,750 mortgage loan.
205
The YSP was $2,680, approximately six points, meaning
13.74%.
that the borrower qualified for a significantly lower interest rate
206
and monthly payment. Why did the broker not provide her with
the lower cost loan? Including the Yield Spread Premium, the
broker’s total compensation was nearly $6,000, more than 13% of
207
Under Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending
the loan amount.
208
Law, this transaction would be illegal.
4.

The Creation of Agency and Agency Relationship Between
Borrowers and Mortgage Brokers.

The new Anti-Predatory Lending Law also creates an agency
209
relationship between borrowers and their mortgage brokers.
Minnesota Statute section 58.161, subdivision 1 then sets forth five
210
First, mortgage brokers must “act in the
specific duties.
borrower’s best interest and in the utmost good faith toward
211
borrowers.” The broker also is prohibited from acting, giving, or
charging “any undisclosed compensation or realize any undisclosed
remuneration, either through direct or indirect means, that inures
to the benefit of the mortgage broker on an expenditure made for
212
Second, brokers are required to carry out all
the borrower.”
213
Third,
“lawful instructions” given to them from the borrowers.
mortgage brokers must disclose to borrowers all material facts that
might reasonably affect the borrower’s rights, interests, or ability to
214
receive an intended benefit from the residential mortgage loan.
Fourth, mortgage brokers are required to use “reasonable care in
215
performing duties,” and, fifth, mortgage brokers must account to

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008).
Id. § 58.161.
Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(1)–(5).
Id § 58.161, subdiv. 1(1).
Id.
Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(2).
Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(3).
Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(4).
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the borrower all of the money and property received as agent.
5.

216

Licensing and Bond

The “Minnesota Residential Mortgage Originator and Servicer
Licensing Act” provides further protection for homeowners and
217
borrowers.
Although not technically part of the 2007 AntiPredatory Lending Law, the Minnesota Residential Mortgage
Originator and Servicer Licensing Act was also amended in 2007 to
218
compliment the provisions and rights outlined above.
Specifically, the Act now requires mortgage brokers to submit a
surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of at least
$50,000 to pay for, among other things, expenses, fines, and fees
levied by the commissioner under this chapter and for losses
219
This bond is important, because often
incurred by borrowers.
the mortgage broker either goes out of business prior to bringing a
lawsuit or declares bankruptcy after a judgment is entered by the
court.
B.The First Case: Hilleshiem v. Source Lending
Although the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law
originally passed in the spring of 2007, the new provisions did not
220
On April 3, 2008,
come into effect until August 1, 2007.
approximately eight months after the law took effect, the first
lawsuit claiming a violation of the new laws was filed by the Housing
Preservation Project, a non-profit law firm in Saint Paul,
221
The plaintiffs were an elderly couple, William
Minnesota.
Hilleshiem and Judy Hilleshiem, who had lived on their small farm
222
The following section summarizes the
for forty-one years.
216. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(5).
217. MINN. STAT. § 58.01 (2008).
218. Id.; See also discussion of Anti-Predatory Lending Law infra pt.III, subsec. A
219. MINN. STAT. § 58.06, subdiv. 2(b)(2) (2008).
220. MINN. STAT. § 58.13 (2006); 2007 Minn. Sess. Laws. Serv. ch. 74, 988
(West).
221. Jessica Mador, Minnesota Public Radio, Elderly Couple Files First Lawsuit
Under New Anti-Predatory Lending Law, Apr. 4, 2008, http://minnesota
.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/04/03/antipredatory.
(“Last year, state
lawmakers passed a new consumer protection law designed to prevent mortgage
lenders from overcharging borrowers. Now an elderly couple from Red Wing has
filed what appears to be the first lawsuit under Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory
Lending law.”) (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
222. First Am. Compl. 1, Hillesheim v. Source Lending Corp., Civil File No. 27-
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allegations made in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
1.

Background

In spring 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem received a phone call
223
from the defendant, Source Lending.
Source Lending stated
224
that it was interested in helping them refinance their home. At
the time, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were living on a very tight
225
budget. They had to pay approximately $898 per month for their
existing mortgage, and then pay other bills for food,
transportation, health care, and utilities using primarily Social
226
Their existing mortgage had an adjustable
Security benefits.
interest rate, and they wanted to refinance and have a fixed interest
227
rate.
Source Lending promised that it could arrange for a fixed
interest rate with a monthly payment of approximately $500 per
month, and they arranged for a mortgage broker to come to their
228
About a week later, a mortgage
home to provide more details.
broker named David Kuntz came to their home and told them
229
about Source Lending’s plan.
Specifically, Kuntz said that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem would not
immediately qualify for the fixed interest rate mortgage with a
230
Source
monthly payment of approximately $500 per month.
Lending, however, could obtain the fixed interest rate mortgage
with a monthly payment of approximately $500 per month, if they
231
agreed to refinance twice.
Kuntz explained that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem would have to
232
Source Lending
refinance twice because of their poor credit.
would help them improve their credit score by first obtaining an
233
After making two or three payments, Mr. and Mrs.
ARM.
Hilleshiem’s credit score would be improved enough to refinance,
CV-08-7612 (June 16, 2008).
223. Id. at 8.
224. Id. at 9.
225. Id. at 10.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 11.
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id. at 13.
230. Id. at 14.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 15.
233. Id.
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234

again, into a fixed-rate mortgage.
Source Lending further told
the plaintiffs that they would pay no closing costs for refinancing
235
the second time.
In reliance on Source Lending’s representations, Mr. and Mrs.
236
Hilleshiem decided to refinance their existing mortgage. On
June 11, 2007, Source Lending’s Dave Kuntz and another person
came to the plaintiffs’ home to sign the various mortgage
237
The June 11, 2007 mortgage loan refinanced the
documents.
plaintiffs’ existing mortgage loan, paying-off their balance of
$127,590.78 and replaced it with a new mortgage with a principal
238
According to the U.S. Department of
balance of $153,750.
Housing & Urban Development Settlement Statement Form
239
(HUD-1), the settlement charges were over $7,000.
Specifically, the defendant charged the plaintiffs $400 for an
appraisal, even though Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem have no memory
of any appraiser entering their home or coming to their property
240
They directly paid Source Lending
to conduct an appraisal.
nearly $4,000 in fees for origination, processing, underwriting,
241
application, and administration. Source Lending was also paid a
$2,882.81 yield spread premium from the lender, meaning that the
interest rate was nearly two points higher than the interest rate that
242
they had actually qualified for. The plaintiffs also paid $175 for a
notary, and whopping $1,175 for title insurance, which is
approximately three to four times higher than the reasonable
243
market-rate for title insurance.
As instructed, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem made two monthly
payments of approximately $1,320 for the June 11, 2007 mortgage
and waited to hear from Source Lending about the second
244
On October 26, 2007, Source Lending arranged for a
refinance.
closing company to come to Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s house to

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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245

sign the various mortgage documents for their second loan.
The second loan paid-off the June mortgage loan of
$156,781.41, and then created a new mortgage loan with the
246
Contrary to Source Lending’s
principal balance of $167,250.
statements, the monthly payment for the new mortgage loan would
247
not be $500 per month. Instead, the monthly payment would be
$1,300 (only about $20 less than the June 11, 2007 mortgage
248
Thus, the amount owed on Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s
loan).
home went up approximately $40,000 in six months and their
249
payments increased 30%.
Much to Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s surprise, there were also
thousands of dollars of closing costs for the October 26, 2007
250
Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were charged another
mortgage loan.
$200 for an appraisal—even though they had purportedly just had
an appraisal four months ago—and, they were charged an
“external” appraisal review fee of $140 and an “internal” appraisal
251
Source Lending also charged Mr. and Mrs.
review fee of $95.
252
Source Lending also
Hilleshiem over $5,000 in additional fees.
received another yield spread premium from the lender in the
amount of $3,972.19, meaning that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem
received an interest rate approximately two points higher than the
253
They were also
interest rate that they had qualified to receive.
254
charged $1,175 for title insurance, again.
2.

Legal Claims Asserted by Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem Against
Source Lending

The lawsuit had a total of seven counts, three of which were
against Source Lending and asserted violations of the 2007 Anti255
Predatory Lending Law. Count I alleged a violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 58.137, subdivision 1, originating a mortgage loan
with points and fees in excess of 5% of the loan, which includes the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
See Id.
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256

yield spread premium received by Source Lending.
Count II
alleged that Source Lending failed to verify Mr. and Mrs.
257
Mr. and Mrs.
Hilleshiem’s ability to pay the mortgage loan.
Hilleshiem’s monthly mortgage payment was approximately 80% of
their monthly income, consisting of a Social Security check and a
small pension. Count III alleged that Source Lending was liable for
violating the Anti-Predatory Lending Law for “churning” Mr. and
258
Specifically, given Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s
Mrs. Hilleshiem.
age, income, liabilities, and the mere $20 to $30 difference
between the monthly payments of the new and refinanced
mortgage, the new mortgage did not provide a tangible net benefit
259
to them.
3.

The Pressure Increases on Source Lending

Later, the Minnesota Attorney General filed a four-count
complaint against Source Lending alleging a pattern of illegal
conduct similar to the allegations made in Mr. and Mrs.
260
Hilleshiem’s complaint.
Specifically, the Minnesota Attorney
General stated that:
Source Lending sold risky and complex loans to
Minnesota consumers, including “Hybrid ARMs” and “Pay
Option ARMs,” by employing a multitude of false,
misleading, and deceptive acts and practices. These
unlawful acts and practices include misleading consumers
about the terms of the loans; using the classic “bait-andswitch” technique; and making false promises of serial
261
refinancing.
The Attorney General’s Complaint alleges that Source
Lending routinely represented in direct mail and on its website
that people can save $200 or more on their monthly mortgage
262
This is
payment by refinancing through one of its brokers.
consistent with Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s claim that Source
Lending represented to her that her monthly mortgage payment
256. Id. at 37–42.
257. Id. at 43–46.
258. Id. at 47–50.
259. Id. at 50.
260. Compare Complaint, Minnesota v. Source Lending Corp., No. 27-CV-0819803 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed August 14, 2008), with First Amended Complaint,
supra note 222.
261. Id. at 1.
262. Id. at 13.
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would drop from approximately $800 to $500.
The Attorney General’s Complaint also states that Source
Lending routinely baited consumers into refinancing, and then
263
switched to another loan on “the eve of closing or at the closing.”
This is also what Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem allege happened to them.
4.

Toward Resolution

On July 11, 2008, Source Lending offered a “Confession of
Judgment” in the amount of $11,187 related to Count I of Mr. and
264
The Confession of Judgment was
Mrs. Hilleshiem’s Complaint.
offered pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 68.01(c),
265
Within the
and did not include attorneys’ fees and costs.
applicable time period, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem accepted the
Confession of Judgment, and then moved the court to immediately
award attorney’s fees and order that the $11,187 either be paid or
266
placed in escrow for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem.
Because of the Attorney General’s lawsuit and the failure of Source
Lending to pay its newspaper advertising bills, Mr. and Mrs.
Hilleshiem were concerned that Source Lending was going out of
business.
That suspicion was confirmed when Source Lending’s counsel
withdrew, and the company defaulted on the remainder of Mr. and
Mrs. Hilleshiem’s claims. Luckily, due to the new Minnesota AntiPredatory Lending Law, there was a bond in place to protect Mr.
and Mrs. Hilleshiem. Judgment was entered against Source
Lending for well over the $50,000 bond amount, and Mr. and Mrs.
267
Hilleshiem proceeded to collect this judgment against the bond.
IV. THE MINNESOTA ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW AS A NATIONAL
MODEL
The strength of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law is the
balance it strikes between specific prohibitions, such as a clear cap

263. Id. at 43.
264. Rule 68.01 Offer of Judgment as to Count 1 of Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-08-7612.
265. See Id.
266. Acceptance of Rule 68.01 Offer of Judgment, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-087612.
267. See Order Granting Summary Judgment and the Award of Reasonable
Attorney Fees and Costs, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-08-7612.
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on financed charges, and general provisions that will apply to the
new predatory lending schemes in the future. It is similar to the
structure and approach of the federal Fair Debt Collection
268
The FDCPA has specific prohibitions,
Practices Act (FDCPA).
such as prohibiting communication once a written request is made
or “depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or
other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such
269
check or instrument.” The FDCPA also has general prohibitions
270
on actions that harass, oppress, or abuse debtors.
The general
and specific aspects of the Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law
are the approach that should be adopted as a model at the federal
level. General and specific provisions complement one another,
and they often, in practice, hasten a resolution to the larger action
by creating clear liability related to one part.
Specific provisions allow the consumer to obtain immediate
relief through litigation. In Hilleshiem, the homeowner received a
Confession of Judgment just six months after filing the lawsuit. But
the broader, more general duties of agency created an opportunity
to recover far more damages. A duty of agency between a
Minnesota borrower and the mortgage broker is also flexible, and
has the ability to adapt to emerging schemes that are not presently
known. A duty of agency is also consistent with how ordinary
borrowers already view their relationship with their mortgage
broker. It should be a uniform, national policy.
Some of these concepts are part of the Mortgage Reform and
Anti-Predatory Lending Act that passed the United States House of
271
Representatives on May 7, 2009. For example, it requires that the
loan have a tangible net benefit for the borrower and that the
272
It also prohibits yield spread
borrower have the ability to pay.
premiums paid outside of closing from a lender to a mortgage
broker as a reward for facilitating a loan with a higher interest rate
273
than the borrower otherwise qualified for.
The bill, however, does not create a legally enforceable agency
relationship between a mortgage broker and the borrower. That is

268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(4).
270. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
271. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th
Cong. (2009).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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short-sighted, and it is a mistake. This agency relationship would
help ensure that the signaling, sorting, and guarantees discussed in
Part II are effective and have a positive effect on the transaction
and the overall market. Additionally, a national law that creates
this legally enforceable relationship can uniformly apply to all
entities, because pre-emption is obviously not an issue with federal
statutes.
If regulation is simply focused or limited to
“independent” mortgage brokers, lenders will just use brokers or
loan officers that are actually bank employees to avoid the
regulations and continue predatory practices.
The other lesson learned from the Hilleshiem litigation is that
predatory lending and damages from predatory lending are
significant. Although Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were able to recover
damages from Source Lending’s bond, they did not collect their
full judgment and the bond is now gone. For the second, third, or
fourth victim of Source Lending’s predatory practices, there is no
bond and there will likely be no recovery. The only thing that
these victims will collect is an empty and uncollectable judgment
against a defunct corporation.
As evidenced by the numerous individuals cited in the
Attorney General’s Complaint, Source Lending’s illegal practices
were pervasive and widespread. Assuming that there are merely
fifty more victims (which is an unreasonably low estimate) that each
had just $15,000 in damages (which is also an unreasonably low
estimate), the total amount of claims would be $750,000. This
illustrates that the statutorily proscribed $50,000 bond is
insufficient to compensate the victims of predatory mortgage
brokers. Either the bond requirement needs to be increased or
there needs to be an alternative system, or both.
Similarly, at a federal level, enactment of any new rights for
borrowers or homeowners must recognize that this is a billion
dollar industry and also that many of the actors appear and
disappear. It is estimated that there will be approximately three
274
hundred bank failures as a result of the current economic crisis.
The number of mortgage brokers that have shut down is even more
striking. For example, in Massachusetts there has been an 80%
275
decrease in the number of mortgage brokers. To the extent that
274. Alistair Barr, Bank Failures to Surge in Coming Years, MARKETWATCH, May
23, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bank-failures-surge-credit-crunch.
275. Eric Convey, Mortgage Misery: After Months of Decline, Broker Ranks Seen
Falling by 80 Percent from Peak, BOSTON BUS. J., June 6, 2008, available at
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Congress uses the Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law as a
model, Congress must ensure that homeowners are financially
protected from under-capitalized and bankrupt companies.
In conclusion, reform of the day-to-day regulation of lending
must take into account the irrationality, emotion, and, sometimes,
exploitation that occurs in a continuing or on-going business
relationships. The foreclosure and economic crisis highlights what
happens when such issues are not taken into account and the
community assumes that markets behave rationally and there is no
need for government regulation. The Minnesota Model provides a
framework for national regulation of predatory lending practices.
It sets clear standards of conduct to eliminate the most egregious
behavior, but also includes broader more flexible standards to
address the predatory lending schemes of tomorrow.

http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2008/06/09/story1.html.
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